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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Appollonia and the Kingdom of Raglan submit their
differences concerning The Mairi Maru to this Court by Special Agreement,
dated May 15, 2004, pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court's Statute. The
parties have agreed to the contents of the Compromis submitted as part of the
Special Agreement. In accordance with Article 36(1) of the Court's Statute,
each party shall accept the judgment of this Court as final and binding and shall
execute it in good faith in its entirety.
I1. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Raglan is responsible for the attack on The Mairi Maru.
2. Whether Raglan owes Appollonia compensation for any injury resulting
from the attack on The Mairi Maru.
3. Whether Raglan violated any obligation owed to Appollonia under
international law by scuttling The Mairi Maru.
4. Whether Appollonia violated international law by shipping MOX through
Raglan's archipelagic waters without giving Raglan prior notification or
receiving its consent.
5. Whether Appollonia is responsible for the damage to the Norton Shallows
and surrounding waters.
6. Whether Appollonia must compensate Raglan for the injury to its fishing
and tourist industries and the cost of decontaminating the area.
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Kingdom of Raglan is a small, developing archipelagic nation lying
roughly halfway between the Republic of Appollonia, a nuclear nation, and the
Democratic Republic of Maguffin. In 1990, Appollonia discovered uranium
deposits below its soil and developed a significant nuclear energy program.
Following its construction of a nuclear reactor, Appollonia reached a
"safeguards agreement" with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
regarding the operation of the plant in 1996. [Compromis In 1, 3].
Appollonia's nuclear reactor produced, as a by-product, a significant
amount of plutonium, which can be used to make mixed oxide fuel (MOX). In
1997, Appollonia entered into a five-year sales agreement with the Maguffm
Atomic Recycling Company, Ltd. for the surplus MOX. Appollonia shipped the
MOX via private carriers through the Raglanian Archipelago to Maguffm.
[Compromis n 4-5, 8].
From 1995 to 1999, several groups of technologically-advanced pirates
routinely attacked ships in Raglan's archipelagic straits. By 1998, the Insurers
of Lading and Shipping Association (ILSA) recognized the danger presented by
the attacks and issued, a "five-point warning," (ILSA's strongest warning) to
insurers and re-insurers of ships traveling the archipelago. As a result, shipping
traffic through the archipelago decreased dramatically. Appollonia, however,
continued its MOX shipment through the archipelago. [Compromis 16-8].
In a July 1999 report, the IAEA criticized Appollonia's transport of MOX,
noting that Appollonia "gives no notice to . . . Raglan that MOX will be
transported through [its] territorial waters or exclusive economic zones. MOX
is shipped without adequate safeguards on private vessels through waters known
to be frequented by pirates." Appollonia responded that its navy was ill-
equipped to protect its MOX shipments, that the private carriers provided better
security, and that the security of the shipments required secrecy. [Compromis
8-10].
To combat the continuing pirate attacks in its straits, Raglan announced its
anti-piracy program in October 1999. The voluntary program provided
requesting ship captains with a Raglanian naval officer to steer the ship through
Raglan's archipelago. The naval pilot would maintain constant contact with the
Raglanian navy, which could respond to an attack within thirty minutes. The
program was highly successful; during the program's first two years, no vessel
utilizing the program was attacked. In response to the reduction in attacks in the
archipelago, ILSA reduced its alert level to a "four-point warning." By
November 2001, the success of the piloting program created a demand that
Raglan's navy was unable to meet with its own personnel. Raglan hired one
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hundred private contractors to supplement its program. [Compromis 9[ 11-13,
Clarifications 9].
The Mairi Maru, a large, double-hulled ocean-going cargo ship, set sail for
Maguffin on July 26, 2002, carrying several canisters of MOX. Only the
Appollonian government, the IAEA, the captain and first officer of the vessel
were aware of the shipment. A storm delayed The Mairi Maru several hours
past its scheduled departure time, and it did not approach the archipelago until
near dusk on July 27, 2002. The ship's captain radioed Raglan requesting a
pilot. Shortly thereafter, one of Raglan's private contractors was transported to
the ship by a privately-owned and operated vessel hired by the Raglanian navy.
He arrived on the ship with two assistants and identified himself as Thomas
Good. [Compromis 14-16, Clarifications ]1 3, 9, 11].
Good boarded the ship on the high seas. The Mairi Maru entered
Raglanian waters at 2200 hours. At 2300 hours, Good informed The Mairi
Maru's captain that he had explosives he would detonate unless the ship was
surrendered to his control. The captain capitulated, and he and the crew were
locked in the ship's galley. Good took control of the vessel, navigating it to a
location where he met with fellow confederates. Good's group removed all of
the ship's navigation equipment, disabled the aft propeller shaft, and then
disembarked, leaving The Mairi Maru to drift on a south-easterly course toward
international waters. The MOX was left undisturbed in a locked hold.
[Compromis 91 17-18, Clarifications 3, 11].
The next day, July 28, 2002, a storm pushed The Mairi Maru into the
Norton Shallows, a region of uninhabited sandbars located 250 nautical miles
from Raglan's archipelagic baseline and used exclusively by Raglan-
incorporated firms for sport fishing and eco-tourism, which provide Raglan with
more than 80 million Euro of tax revenue annually. The Mairi Maru ran
aground in the Shallows. Its hull was breached, and the compartment
containing the MOX canisters was ruptured, causing damage to the canisters.
The canisters began to leak into the surrounding area, and over fifty kilograms
of highly radioactive MOX pellets spilled out onto the sandbar and into the
surrounding water. A Raglanian naval patrol boat spotted the wreckage on July
29, 2002. Upon arrival, the naval medical support team found several crew
members dead, and the rest suffering from acute radiation syndrome.
[Compromis 1 2, 19-20, Corrections 14, Clarifications 4].
Raglan's Prime Minister Robert Price notified the President of Appollonia,
Judith Stark, that The Mairi Maru had crashed, and was leaking radioactive
material causing severe damage to the entire region. Further, impending storms
threatened to spread the radioactive material toward Raglan's inhabited islands.
Mr. Price noted that Appollonia failed to give Raglan notice of the MOX
shipments, which he maintained violated Appollonia's duties as a member of
the IAEA. Had notice been given, Raglan would have either denied The Mairi
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Maru access to the straits, or taken greater efforts to protect the ship and its
cargo. Lastly, Mr. Price informed Appollonia that Raglan expected Appollonia
to pay for the cleanup of the area, and compensate Raglan for its lost tourism
revenue. [Compromis 21, 22, 24, 25].
On August 4, 2002, Raglan announced its intention to sink the ship and the
MOX to the ocean floor. Raglan maintained that scuttling The Mairi Maru was
its only option to minimize the danger presented by the ship. Later that week,
Raglan encased the MOX in canisters, towed The Mairi Maru to Sand Deep and
sunk the vessel 9000 meters. [Compromis 21-24, Corrections 4,
Clarifications l 4, 12].
Appollonia responded, claiming it had met its obligations regarding the
shipments, and that Raglan must bear responsibility "for the crash and its
consequences." Regarding the shipping, Appollonia maintained that Raglan
was aware of the shipping, it did not breach its obligations as a member of the
IAEA, and that Raglan has no standing to raise issues regarding IAEA
obligations. [Compromis 9J] 25-29].
Regarding the scuttling, Appollonia insisted Raglan was responsible for the
attack on The Mairi Maru, and that its negligence in screening pilots made
Raglan liable for the loss of the ship, and harm to its crew. Appollonia also
announced that it considered Raglan's actions a violation of the London
Convention. [Compromis Ti 28-30].
Taking notice of the increased tension between the two nations, the
Regional Organization of Nations (RON), in a July 1, 2003 session, called upon
Raglan and Appollonia to bring this case before the International Court of
Justice. The nations agreed, and the submissions of both parties followed.
[Compromis 30-33].
V. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
I. Raglan incurred no liability for Thomas Good's attack on The Mairi Maru
because no international obligation owing to Appollonia was breached.
Piracy was codified as a crime under international law solely to provide
states with an extraterritorial basis for jurisdiction over crimes that
occurred on the high seas. As such, international law delineates no basis
for a claim of piracy in a case such as this, where criminals hijack ships
within sovereign waters. Additionally Raglan's successful anti-piracy
program, with the full force of the Raglanian Navy behind it, met the
general international law obligation of all states to cooperate fully in
suppressing piracy. In any event, the hijacking of The Mairi Maru was in
direct contravention of Good's duties as a safety officer and wholly outside
Raglan's control. Because international law distinguishes between acts
committed under a state's direction, and acts outside the scope of state
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control, refusing to hold states responsible for the latter, Good's actions
cannot be attributable to Raglan.
II. Raglan acted reasonably and in accordance with international law in
scuttling The Mairi Maru. Due to Raglan's treaty and customary
international law obligations requiring protection of the marine
environment, Raglan had no choice but to scuttle the vessel. Though the
radiation-leaking ship already posed a grave threat to the Norton Shallows
and surrounding waters, the impending rainy season threatened
catastrophic exposure to the entire region, making cleanup impossible.
Although time was of the essence, Raglan abided by all applicable
international obligations prior to and during the scuttling the vessel.
Raglan's lack of alternatives in the matter justifies its actions under the
necessity doctrine, which precludes wrongfulness where a state must take
actions that may be considered unlawful in less demanding circumstances.
IH. Appollonia violated international law by shipping MOX through Raglan's
archipelago without providing prior notification of the transit. Raglan's
right to require notification and/or consent is consistent with the provisions
governing navigational regimes and nuclear transport in the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, widely recognized as a codification of
international law. Further, evidence of the right to require prior
notification exists in the significant amount of domestic legislation that
requires prior notification of ships carrying ultra-hazardous cargo, and,
more importantly, in the number of shipping states that understand their
legal obligation to comply with this legislation. Furthermore, regulations
promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency require
Appollonia to notify "pass-through" states like Raglan of the shipment of
nuclear materials. Any claims that the secrecy of the transit was required
for security purposes demonstrates Appollonia's unabashed disregard not
only for the safety of the region's inhabitants, but also for the region's
entire eco-system.
IV. Raglan has standing to bring a claim for compensation for the cost of
decontaminating the Norton Shallows and the injury to its fishing and
tourism industries based on an erga omnes duty to protect the marine
environment. Appollonia is liable to Raglan under several theories of
liability. First, Appollonia violated its customary international legal
obligation to prevent transboundary environmental harm. Second,
international law recognizes a strict-liability system of fault for injury
arising from ultra-hazardous activity, including the shipment of hazardous
nuclear material. Lastly, even under a "due diligence" system of fault,
Appollonia cannot plausibly maintain that it met its duty of general care to
prevent transboundary environmental harm when it launched The Mairi
Maru and its nuclear cargo without notifying Raglan of the ship's contents.
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VI. PLEADINGS
A. Raglan Is Not Responsible For The Attack On The Mairi Maru And Owes
No Compensation For Any Resulting Injury
1. Raglan met any obligation under international law to prevent piracy, and
is not responsible for the attack and its aftermath
Thomas Good's hijacking of The Mairi Maru was criminal and reprehen-
sible. However, under international law, Raglan incurs no liability based upon
Good's actions. Although pirates have long been considered hostis humanis
generis,' the duty of nations regarding piracy is less obligatory than that term
suggests. The 1932 Harvard Draft Articles on Piracy, which served as the
foundation for the piracy sections of both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas (hereinafter 1958 Convention) and 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter 1982 Convention),2 explains that the
establishment of piracy as a crime is intended to permit states to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute and punish pirates, but does not require
them to do so. 3
Moreover, any obligation imposed by either treaty or customary inter-
national law is far from absolute. Under Article 100 of the 1982 Convention,
to which Raglan is a party,4 and which codifies customary international law,'
"States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy
on the high seas."' 6 This obligation echoes Article 18 of the Harvard Draft,
which proposed that parties "agree to make every expedient use of their powers
to prevent piracy, separately and in co-operation." 7 Raglan's highly successful
anti-piracy program represented the fullest extent of its capabilities to prevent
such attacks. Raglan hired one hundred independent contractors to supplement
1. Ian Brownie, Principles of Public International Law 244 (3d ed. 1979); Patricia W. Birnie,
Piracy Past, Present and Future, 11 MARINE POL'Y 163, 165, 170 (1987).
2. George Smith, From Cutlass to Cat-O '-Nine Tails: The Case for Int 7 Jurisdiction of Mutiny
on the High Seas, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 227,230 (1989); Barry H. Dubner, Human Rights and Envt. Disaster,
Two Problems that Defy the "Norms " of the Int'7 Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1,
16-17 (1997).
3. Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Commentary to the Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L
L. Stpp. 749, 760 (1932) [hereinafter "Harvard Research, Piracy"].
4. United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, art. 100, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. See Patricia W. Bimie, supra note 1, at 165; D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea
(1982); John Norton Moore, Customary International Law After the Convention, in THE DEVELOPING ORDER
OF THE OCEANS 41 (Robert E. Krueger & Stefan A. Risenfeld eds., 1985).
6. UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 100; Convention on the High Seas, art. 14, Apr. 27, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312 [hereinafter 1958 Convention].
7. Harvard Research, Piracy, supra note 3, at 746.
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a program that already employed all available naval officers to pilot ships
through the archipelago. As a developing nation, Raglan did all it could with
the limited resources available to it.
2. Thomas Good's actions do not constitute piracy under international law
and are not an appropriate basis for an international legal claim
Thomas Good's actions do not constitute piracy under international law.
As established in several international legal instruments, the offense of piracy
requires the following elements:
1) Illegal acts of violence or detention;
2) Committed for private ends;
3) By the crew or passengers of a ship;
4) against another ship or against persons or property on board the other
ship; and
5) On the high seas.'
The element requiring that piracy occur on the high seas is fundamental because
initial codification of the crime was to provide extra-territorial jurisdiction to
states seeking to prosecute pirates.9 Although Good boarded The Mairi Maru
on the high seas, his crimes were committed within Raglan's territorial
jurisdiction. While this Court has never definitively addressed the question
regarding the treatment of crimes in which the elements are committed in
multiple jurisdictions, this Court may refer to Article 38(1)(c) of its statute. 10
These general principles of law support the proposition that where any element
of an offense is committed within the jurisdiction of a state, that state may
consider itself the territorial state and may assert jurisdiction over the offender."
Thus, although Good may be prosecuted by Raglan for armed robbery,
hijacking, or a similar offense, he may not be charged with piracy.
8. 1958 Convention, supra note 8, at art. 14; UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 101; Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 222; Robert Beckman, Combating Piracy andArmedRobbery Against Ships in Southeast Asia: The
Way Forward, 33 OcEANDE. & INT'LL 317,328 (2002); Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas:
The Achille Lauro, Piracy, and IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 272 (1988).
9. Harvard Research, Piracy, supra note 3.
10. Statute of the Int'l Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, available at http:
//www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/basicdocumnts/Basetex/istatute.html.
11. See e.g., U.S. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(l)(a) (1962); HENRY P. DE VRIES ET AL., FRENCH
LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION (rev. 1988); Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 693; Mi
Zhou & Shizhou Wang, China, in 2 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, (Dupont & Fijnaut eds., 1993); Daniel
David Ntanda Nsereko, Criminal Law and Procedure in Uganda, in INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS (L.
Dupont & C. Fijnaut eds., 1996); HR 6 April 1915, NJ 1915 (Netherlands), p. 427 (cited in J.A.W. Lensing,
The Netherlands 51, in 3 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, (Dupont & Fijnaut eds., 1993).
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3. Thomas Good's actions are not attributable to Raglan
Raglan is not legally responsible for the events surrounding the attack and
crash of The Mairi Maru. As explained in Article 2 of the International Law
Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which this Court
may consider as evidence of customary international law, states are only liable
for conduct attributable to the state that constitutes a breach of an international
obligation.' Raglan breached no obligation with regard to piracy. Good did
not commit piracy under the internationally recognized definition, and, in any
event, Raglan met any duty to prevent and suppress the same. Good's attack on
The Mairi Maru certainly violated municipal law. However, the attack breached
no international legal obligation owing to Appollonia 3 This Court recognized
in the ELSI case that "[c]ompliance with municipal law and compliance with the
provisions of a treaty are different questions."' 4 Good's actions cannot legally
be attributed to Raglan, and thus do not give rise to Raglan's responsibility for
the loss of The Mairi Maru.
a. Thomas Good acted contrary to Raglan's instruction and
outside Raglan's control
Under international law, a state is not responsible for all acts performed by
its nationals," and the state must direct or control the activity attributed to it. 6
12. International Law Commission [ILC], Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-third
Session, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2, International Law
Commission, U.N. GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 A/56/10 (Apr. 23 - June 1 & July 2 - Aug. 10, 2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of States]. See also, Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (June 27); Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slov.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 47 (Feb. 5); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 4, at para. 170
(July 29, 1989); The Rainbow Warrior Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 217 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1990).
13. Malvina Halberstam, International Maritime Navigation and the Installations on the High Seas,
in M. CHEREF BASSIoUNI, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIANAL LAw 819 (2d ed. 1999); Beckman, supra note 8, at
320.
14. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELS1), (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 51 (July 20); See also
Norwegian Shipowners' Claims Case (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 309, 331 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1922);
See generally The Tinoco Case (U.K. v. Costa Rica), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 371, 386 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1923);
The Wollemborg Case (Italy v. U.S.), 14 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 283, 289 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1956).
15. See e.g. IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 132-66
(1983); David D. Caron, The Basis ofResponsibility: Attribution and Other Trans-Substantive Rules, in THE
IRAN-UNrrED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 109
(Richard B. Lillich et al., eds., 1998); HARITI DIPLA, LA RESPONSABILITE DE L'ETAT POUR VIOLATION DES
DRorrS DE L'HOMME: PROBLtMES D'IMPUTATION (1994); F. Prezetacznik, The Int'l Responsibility ofStates
for the Unauthorized Acts oftheir Organs, I SRI LANKA J. OF INT'L L 151 (1989).
16. DraftArticles on Responsibility ofStates, supra note 12, at 104; Starrett Housing Corp. v. Gov't
ofthe Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U. S. C1. Trib. Rep. 122, 143 (1983); Loizidou v. Turkey, Merits, 6 Eur.
Ct. H. R. 2216, 2235-36 (1996).
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In Nicaragua, this Court refused to attribute the activities of Nicaraguan contras
to the United States, even though it recognized the substantial role of the U.S.
in "financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping the contras," as
well as "the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of
the whole of its operation."' 7 Instead, this Court required Nicaragua prove that
the U.S. directed the perpetration of the acts which formed the basis of
Nicaragua's complaint. Absent such proof, this Court held that the contras' acts
were not attributable to the U.S. 8 Under this test, Good's actions are clearly not
attributable to Raglan. Indeed, unlike the U.S. in Nicaragua, Raglan's purpose
in employing Good was to prevent attacks, not to direct individuals like Good
to carry them out. Because he acted contrary to Raglan's direction and outside
of its control, Good's acts are not attributable to Raglan under standards
established by this Court.
b. Raglan is not responsible for Thomas Good's ultra vires actions
Under international law, state responsibility for ultra vires actions only
attaches when individuals act so that they appear "as competent officials" using
"powers or methods appropriate to their official capacity."' 9  As the ILC
recognized, "[c]ases where officials acted in their capacity as such, albeit
unlawfully or contrary to instructions, must be distinguished from cases where
the conduct is so removed from the scope of their official functions that it
should be assimilated to that of private individuals, not attributable to the
State."2 Though he appeared as an official when boarding the ship, within an
hour it was clear that Good was acting far outside his capacity as a Raglanian
pilot. When Good and his associates threatened the crew with explosives and
commandeered the vessel, they ceased to be "competent officials or agents" of
Raglan.
Significantly, the Iran Claims Tribunal recognized in the Yeager Case2'
that an individual's ultra vires conduct is not attributable if the individual or
organ acts in a "purely private" rather than an official capacity, even if the
individual or organ "used means placed at its disposal by the State for the
exercise of its function."22 In Yeager, an Iran Air agent commandeered the
17. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64.
18. Id.
19. The Caire Case, (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 516, 530 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1929); The
Mosse Case, 13 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 494 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1953).
20. DraftArticles on Responsibility ofStates, supra note 12, at 102; see also Jan Arno Hessbruegge
The Historical Dev. of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in Int ' Law, 36 N. Y U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 265, 270 (2004).
21. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 92 (1987); cf. Petrolane, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, 92 (1991).
22. Id. at 110-11.
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ticket office of Iran Air, a government-owned airline, and illegally required
passengers to pay extra money for plane tickets already purchased. In deter-
mining that the agent's acts were not attributable to the Iranian government, the
Tribunal noted that the Iran Air agent was not "acting for any other reason than
personal profit," and there was no indication that he had "passed on the payment
to Iran Air., 23 Similarly, Good abused his position as a privately-contracted
ship pilot. His actions were undertaken entirely for his own personal gain and
that of his confederates. Therefore, Good's acts are not attributable to Raglan
under international law.
B. Raglan Is Not Liable To Appollonia For Scuttling The Mairi Maru
1. Raglan is obligated to protect the marine environment
As a party to the 1982 Convention, Raglan is required to protect and
preserve the marine environment.24 In addition, customary international law
recognizes the rights of coastal states to intervene where their shores and
citizens are threatened by pollution.2 ' The radiation leaking from The Mairi
Maru presented a grave risk to the marine environment and human safety
throughout the region. Raglan had no option but to scuttle the vessel. As
Raglan's Prime Minster Price explained, "[w]ith every passing day, more
noxious material leak[ed] into the open waters." '26 Further, the impending rainy
season made it entirely likely that the pollution, then only twenty-five
kilometers from Raglan's exclusive economic zone, would soon spread to
Raglan's western islands.
2. Raglan's actions were necessary for the protection of the region's
inhabitants, as well as the surrounding waters and marine life
The scuttling of The Mairi Maru was justified under the doctrine of
necessity. International law recognizes that actions that may be considered
breaches under certain circumstances are justified when the situation presents
"nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity."27  In the Gabcikovo-
23. Id.
24. UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 221.
25. See Int'l Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter
"SOLAS"]; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 1341 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78]; International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, art. 1, Nov. 29 1969, 26 U.S.T.
765, 970 U.N.T.S. 212.
26. Compromis, 24.
27. R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 91 (1938); Russian Fur
Seals Controversy of 1893, 86 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 220 (1893); See generally Fisheries
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Nagymoros case,28 this Court recognized that the ILC's codification of necessity
in Article 33 of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility "reflect[s] customary
international law."29 The recognized elements are as follows:
Necessity may be invoked only when the act "(a) [i]s the only way for the
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or the international community as a whole."30
Further, a state may only invoke necessity provided it has not "contributed
to the situation of necessity."
31
a. The nuclear materials emanating from The Mairi Maru presented a grave
and imminent peril
The radioactive material emanating from The Mairi Maru presented a
grave risk to the crew of the ship, several of whom are dead, the marine
environment surrounding the ship, and any cleanup crew dispatched to the area.
The impending rainy season and its accompanying winds threatened to spread
radiation throughout the region, endangering not only the Shallows, but the
nations of Raglan and Maguffin as well. Cleanup before the rainy season was
impossible.
International law recognizes the importance of human safety and
environmental health.32 The harm implicated by a nuclear accident is
unmatched in human experience. Not only do nuclear materials cause
immediate and mass destruction to the area in which the accident occurs, but the
harm continues for generations. Chromosomal damage and birth defects are an
irreversible consequence of nuclear exposure. 33 The Mairi Maru, stranded upon
the Shallows and emanating radiation, presented the gravest, most imminent
threat possible to the surrounding environment and the human community in the
Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4); Okon Akiba, Int'l Law of the Sea: The Legality
of Canadian Seizure of the Spanish Trawler (EstaQ, 37 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 809 (1997); See generally Andreas
Laursen, The Use o Force and (the State o) Necessity, 37 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2004).
28. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 7.
29. Id. at 40, 51; see also Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for International
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1, 4-12 (2000); M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea),
120 I.L.R. 143 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
30. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 12, at art. 25(2)(a)-(b); See also,
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 45.
31. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 12, at art. 25(2)(b); Roberto Ago,
Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/318/ADD.5-7, reprinted in [1980]
2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 13 (pt. 1), para. 77.
32. Russian Fur Seals Controversy of 1893, supra note 27; Akiba, supra note 27.
33. See generally, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Lexis 8, 44-45 (July 8).
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region. These dangers would increase exponentially if the radioactive materials
were allowed to remain in the water long enough for a cleanup crew to attempt
to salvage the ship and detoxify it. Scuttling was the only means of avoiding a
catastrophe.
b. Raglan's interest in protecting the region at large outweighs any
competing interests in salvaging the wreckage
Raglan's scuttling was consistent with state practice on this question. In
the Torrey Canyon incident, the Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon went
aground outside British territorial waters, spilling large amounts of oil that
threatened the English coastline.34 The British Government bombed the ship
and burned the remaining oil,35 "stress[ing] the existence of a situation of
extreme danger." No international protest resulted.36 This Court should view
Raglan's actions with similar deference, as its coastline was also threatened by
a crash outside its territorial waters. Just as Britain's interests in protecting its
coastline outweighed Liberia's interest in recovering the Torrey Canyon, this
Court should recognize Raglan's analogous interest in this matter. Appollonia
cannot plausibly assert that its interest in The Mairi Maru and its cargo was
greater than Raglan's interest in protecting human life and the marine
environment. Raglan concedes Appollonia's interest in preserving its flag
vessels; 7 however, the interest of the entire international community in avoiding
a nuclear disaster clearly justifies Raglan's actions.
c. Raglan did not substantially contribute to the situation requiring the
scuttling
Subparagraph 2(b) of Article 25 is a narrow exception preventing states
from relying upon the necessity plea if they substantially contributed to the
harm. As the commentary explains, "[fjor a plea of necessity to be precluded
... the contribution to the situation of necessity must be sufficiently substantial
and not merely incidental or peripheral."3 Given Raglan's lack of knowledge
34. HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, THE "TORREY CANYON," 1976, Cmnd. 3246 [hereinafter
THE "TORREY CANYON"]; See also Anne Bardin, Coastal State s Jurisdiction over Foreign Vessels, 14 PACE
INT'L L. REv. 27, 62 (2002); P. J. Griggs, Toward a Third Party Liab. Convention, 22 TuL. MAR. L. J. 119,
122 (1997).
35. THE "TORREY CANYON", supra note 34; See generally EDWARD COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE
TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); See generally CRISPN GILL ET AL., THE WRECK OF THE TORREY CANYON
(1967).
36. THE "TORREY CANYON", supra note 34.
37. See generally S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
38. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 12, at 205; See also, Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, 1997 L C.J. at 7.
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about the ship's nuclear cargo, and its ongoing efforts to safeguard ships from
attack, it would be unjust to preclude Raglan's invocation of the necessity
defense, considering the catastrophic harm it prevented by scuttling The Mairi
Maru.
C. Appollonia Violated International Law When It Failed To Provide
Raglan With Prior Notification Of Its Clandestine MOX Shipments
In the last decade, several shipments of nuclear materials have
circumnavigated the globe,39 posing a threat to coastal nations' environmental,
ecological and economic security. Consequently, these states have protested
and claimed a right to deny permission to enter their national waters. The attack
on The Mairi Maru illustrates the hazardous outcomes that can occur when
states disregard the rights of nations along their shipping routes.
1. Appollonia violated the 1982 Convention by failing to notify Raglan of
the transportation of ultra-hazardous materials through its archipelago
a. The archipelagic regime permits Raglan to demand prior notification of
the transport of ultra-hazardous material through its archipelagic waters
As an archipelagic nation, Raglan's very existence depends on the sea.
The 1982 Convention represents an important development in the environ-
mental law of the sea that recognized and addressed the unique difficulties
facing archipelagic nations.40 Under the 1982 Convention, archipelagic waters
are submitted to the same regime as the territorial sea, i.e. the suspendible right
of innocent passage for foreign vessels.4' However, the archipelagic state may
designate sea lanes to be used for expeditious passage through the archipelago
42
Such sea lanes are submitted to a regime that is essentially identical to "transit
passage" through straits used for international navigation.43 All ships enjoy the
right of "archipelagic sea lanes passage" and no distinctions may be made
39. See Document 49, 3 THE UNITED NATIONS BLUE BOOKS SERIES, 187 et seq. (1995).
40. See Moira L. McConnell & Edgar Gold, The Modem Law of the Sea: Framework for the
Protection and Preservation of the Marine Env't, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 99 (1991); see also, Rachel
Zajacek, The Dev. of Measure to Protect the Marine Env'tfrom Land Based Pollution: The Effectiveness of
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Auth. in Managing the Effects of Tourism on the Marine Env 't, 3 JAMES
COOK U. L. REV. 64, 65 (1996).
41. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 52(2).
42. Id. art. 53.
43. UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 54; B. Kwiatkowska, The Archipelagic Regime in the Practice
of the Phil andIndon.-Making or Breaking Int'l Law?, 6 INT'L J. OF ESTUARINE AND COASTAL L. 25-26
(1991).
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according to the nature of the vessel or its cargo.44 However, the enjoyment of
these freedoms does not limit the rights of the archipelagic state to require ships
carrying ultra-hazardous material to pass through specific sea lanes, and to
observe precautionary measures established by international agreements45 and
generally accepted international regulations." One such fundamental regulation
provides archipelagic nations the right to demand notice of ultra-hazardous
shipments traversing these sea lanes.47
Notification requirements do not impinge upon Appollonia's right to
continuous and expeditious passage through the archipelago,48 and are
consistent with the provisions of the 1982 Convention requiring that the flag
state has due regard for archipelagic states' rights and duties.49 Furthermore, a
requirement of notification does not constitute discrimination based on the
characteristics of a vessel's cargo, which would contravene Articles 24 and 26
of the 1982 Convention."0 Raglan stresses that prior notification by the
originating state does not hamper a vessels passage, and does not violate the
1982 Convention's non-discrimination provisions. This notification is vital for
archipelagic states, whose waters are often marked by shoals, rocks and coral
reefs. Navigation through these waters is far more dangerous and the risk of
accidents higher than in the territorial sea."' Without notice that the transit of
ultra-hazardous material is pending, an archipelagic nation cannot take the
safety precautions necessary to protect all potentially affected parties from
harm.5
2
b. The archipelagic regime in the 1982 Convention is customary
international law binding upon Appollonia
International law recognizes that provisions of multilateral treaties can bind
third party states by either incorporating or giving recognition to a customary
44. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 41-42, 44, 53(2); Cf HMAN W. JAYEWARDENE, 15 THE REGIME
OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-62 (Shigeru Oda gen ed., 1990); See also T. Treves, La navigation,
in TRAIt DU NOUVEAU DRorr DE LA MER 687, 800-02 (Rene-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds.,1985).
45. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 38.
46. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 22, 23; E.g., MARPOL 73/78, supra note 25; SOLAS, supra note
25; Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, T.I.A.S. No.
8587.
47. See discussion infra Part W.B.
48. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 23.
49. Id. arts. 58(3), 87(2).
50. Id. arts. 24, 26.
51. MOHAMED MUNAVVAR, 22 OCEAN STATES: ARCHIPELAGIC REGIMES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA
166 (Shigeru Oda gen. ed., 1995).
52. See Press Release, Dominican Republic, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Declaration of
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic (January 2, 1998).
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rule, or as beingfors at ariso of an area of international law that subsequently
secured the general assent of states and thereby was transformed into custom.5 3
Rapid crystallization into customary law is possible where "state practice,
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, [was] both
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked," and if the
provision reflected "settled practice, [and] . . . evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."
Raglan submits that the provisions relating to archipelagic waters in the
1982 Convention, ratified by over 145 nations, are a codification of customary
international law." Chapter IV of the 1982 Convention reflects long-standing
practice of archipelagic nations and regional agreements proscribing rights in
the waters surrounding archipelagos.56 Moreover, although several maritime
nations, including the United States, have yet to ratify the convention, none
expressed their opposition on the provisions governing archipelagos. For
example, the United States initially withheld ratification because of the
provisions dealing with the deep sea-bed mining regime, but it nonetheless
recognized that the 1982 Convention otherwise expressed customary
international law; in fact, the treaty has been submitted to the U.S. Senate for
ratification." According to the U.S. State Department, "the convention...
contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which
generally confirm maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of
all states."58
53. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after Vienna Convention]; Military and Paramilitary Activities In andAgainst Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 138;
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 43 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter
Continental Shell]; see also R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES CoURS 27, 64 (1970);
Anthony D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law,
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, n. 4 (1970).
54. Continental Shelf supra note 53, at 1 74, 77.
55. Gulf of Maine (Can v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Christopher Joyner, The Southern Ocean
and Marine Pollution: Problems and Prospects, 17 CASE W. J. INT'L L. 165, 180 (1985).
56. U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, LAWS AND REGULATION ON THE REGmM OF THE TERRITORIAL
SEA at 38-39, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1957); See generally An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 3046 (June 17, 1961) (Phil.), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15;
See generally An Act to Amend Section One of the Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty-Six,
Entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", Rep. Act No. 5446 (Sept.
18, 1968) (Phil.), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15; Note verbale dated January 20, 1956 from the Philippines,
reprinted in II YB ILC 1956, at 69; Announcement on the Territorial Waters of the Republic of Indon. of 14
Dec. 1957, 4 M. WHrrEMAN DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 284 (1965).
57. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing on T.Doc. 103-39 Before the United
States Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar),
available at http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/hrgO31014a.html.
58. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, white House Office of Policy
Information, Issue Update No. 10 at 8 (April 15, 1983); 83 Dep't of State Bull. No. 2075 at 70 (1983).
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2. Appollonia violated the customary international law obligation requiring
prior notification for the transportation of ultra-hazardous materials through
the waters of third party states
a. Widespread state practice reflects the existence of a norm requiring prior
notification for the transport of ultra-hazardous materials
Regardless of the 1982 Convention's applicability to Appollonia, wide-
spread state practice and opiniojuris evince a clear duty to provide notification
under customary international law. Many coastal states and archipelagic nations
require notice from shipping states regarding the contents of ultra-hazardous
cargoes. Countries on the most important shipping routes, including Oman,5 9
Iran,6 Egypt,6' Guinea,62 Malaysia, 63 Malta," Spain,65 Peru,'e Saudi Arabia,
67
and Yemen 68 require not only notification but also prior consent because these
states face a high risk of pollution from accidents at sea. Other states, including
the Philippines,69 Venezuela,70 Haiti, Fiji and several Caribbean states7' go even
further by forbidding the transit of any vessel carrying dangerous materials
59. See Declaration of Oman Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Aug. 17, 1989), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/conventions-declarations.html.
60. AcT ON THE MARINE AREAS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE
OMAN SEA 1993, Sec. 9 (Iran), reprinted in 24 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 10 (Dec. 1993).
61. See Declaration of Egypt Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Aug. 26, 1983), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/conventions-declarations.html.
62. Presidential Decree of Papau New Guinea, no. 336, 30 July 1980.
63. See Declaration of Malaysia Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Oct. 14, 1996), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/os/convention-agreements/conventions-decarations.htm.
64. Act no. XXVIII (Malta, 1981), UN Doc. LE 113 (3-3) (16 November 1981).
65. Act No. 25/64 of29 April 1964 ConcemingNuclear Energy, ch. XI, B.O.E. (1964), in U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/16.
66. Decree No. 027-77-EM, Nov. 16, 1977 (Peru).
67. Declaration of Saudi Arabia Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Apr. 24, 1996), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/os/convention_agreements/conventions-declarations.html.
68. Declaration of Yemen Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (July 21, 1987), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/Ios/convention-agreements/conventions-decLarations.html.
69. An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Providing Penalities
for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 6969 (Oct. 26, 1990) (Phil.).
70. Art. 54 of Presidential Decree no. 2/211 on Norms on the Control of the Generation and
Management of Hazardous Wastes (Venezuela, 1992).
71. See Note verbale dated February 18, 1988 from Haiti's Ministry of the Interior, Decentralization,
the General Police Force and the Civil Service, in 11 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 13 (July 1988).
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through their waters. The United Arab Emirates, 72 Yemen,73 Djibuti,74
Pakistan,7" Poland 6 and Canada" expressly require nuclear propelled vessels
and ships carrying dangerous substances to notify transit states of their pass-
age.78 Finally, France requires ships transiting through its territorial waters to
report the nature of their cargo before entering them.79
Further, evidence of state practice is indicated by the strident objections
voiced by the international community during the recent voyages of ships
carrying ultra-hazardous materials. Several Caribbean and Latin American
states, as well as Malaysia, forbade the entrance of the Pacific Pintail into their
territorial waters.8" In July 1999, South Africa ordered two ships carrying MOX
to Japan not to enter its territorial sea.8 In January 2001, an Argentine court
ordered the Argentinean government to prevent a British ship (the Pacific Swan)
carrying an eighty ton cargo of highly radioactive nuclear fuel to Japan from
entering waters under its control, arguing it would put the country's shoreline
at risk from a toxic spill.82
In 2001, Ireland came before the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, seeking provisional measures against the United Kingdom to suspend its
decision to construct a MOX plant. Ireland's objections were based on the risks
involved in the transport of radioactive material to and from the plant.8 3 The
Tribunal ultimately rejected Ireland's application because it found the situation
72. Federal Law No. 19 in Respect of the Delimitation of the Maritimes Zones of the United Arab
Emirates, art. 5(4) Oct. 17, 1993 (U.A.E.).
73. Yemen, Act no. 45/1977, Art. 8 in U.N. Legislative Series, National Legislation and Treaties
Relating to the Law of the Sea 21, at 24 (1980).
74. Djibuti, Law no. 521AN179, Art. 7, in R.W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMS: AN
ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 112 (1986).
75. Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, Pakistan, para. 3(3), Dec. 31, 1976, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/19.
76. Act Concerning the Maritime Areas of the Polish Republic and the Marine Admin., 1991, arts.
10 and 11, (Pol.).
77. Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations SOR/2001-286 (Can.).
78. Erik Jaap Molenaar, Navigational Rights and Freedoms in a European Regional Context, in 35
NAVIGATIONAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 22, 30 (Donald R. Rothwell & Sam
Bateman eds., 2000).
79. Decree No. 78-421 on Sea Pollution Caused by Shipping Incidents, art. 1, Mar. 24, 1978 (Fr.).
80. Malaysia Bans Ship Carrying Nuclear Waste to Japan, REUTER NEWS SERviCE, Jan. 15, 1997,
http://www.nci.org/c/cs-malay.htm; See also Press Release, Papua New Guinea, Shipment of Vitrified High
Level Nuclear Waste Must Respect Concerns of Forum Islands Countries (Jan. 24, 1997),
http://www.nci.org/c/cs-png.htm.
81. UK Nuclear Fuel Ships Asked to Stay Out of South Africa's Waters, BBC WORLD BROADCASTS,
Report by the South African News Agency SAPA, July 26, 1999, http://www.nci.org/k-m/moxclips.htm.
82. Court Blocks Nuclear Ship from Argentine Waters, REUTER NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 11, 2001.
83. Memorial of Ireland MOX Plant Case (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001);
Maid Tanaka, Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute: A Proposed Protocol on Marine Envtl.
Impact Assessment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337 (2004).
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was not urgent;84 however, there was no contest as to the potential for environ-
mental harm.85
b. Opiniojuris reflects the existence of a norm requiring prior notification
for the transport of ultra-hazardous materials
States provide notice because of a sense of legal obligation. Virtually all
states have accepted specific obligations to notify potentially affected states of
the transport of nuclear material through their waters. Over 200 states are party
to the 1992 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,86 the 1991 Bamako Convention on the
Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa,8 7 and the 1996 Izmir Protocol
on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, all of which require
notification to potentially affected states. In addition, the Rio and Stockholm
Declarations, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive
Material, recognize the existence of a customary notification obligation.88
3. Appollonia's failure to provide notification to Raglan also constitutes a
breach of the regulatory regime established by the IAEA for safe transport of
nuclear material
Appollonia is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) and a member of the IAEA. Under the NPT, Appollonia was
84. See MOX Plant Case (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Dec. 3, 2001); See
generally, Richard Nadelson, After MOX: The Contemporary Shipment ofRadioactive Substances in the Law
of the Sea, 15 INT'L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 193, n.2 (2000).
85. Id.
86. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 6, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel Convention]; TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC DOCUMENTS 32
(Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H. A. Soons eds., 1993).
87. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Jan. 29, 1990 reprinted in 30 I.L.M.773-99.
88. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14 1992, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, princ. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 13, 1992) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration]; INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA], CODE OF PRACTICE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE, at 111(5), IAEA Doc. GC(XXXIV)920 (June 27,
1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 557, 558 [hereinafter AEA Code of Practice]; United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, princ. 21, U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14 at 3 (1973), reprintedin I1 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
Distinguished Brief
obligated to conduct its nuclear activities in accord with a safeguards agreement
with the IAEA.89 In administering the safeguards system, the IAEA is
authorized to require members to "observ[e] any health and safety measures
prescribed by the Agency.""' Because Appollonia is a member of the IAEA and
its nuclear program is subject to the IAEA safeguards system, any IAEA rules
or regulations relating to health and safety are binding.
The IAEA has adopted specific regulations obligating Appollonia to notify
Raglan of its MOX shipments. Section 820 of the IAEA's Regulations for the
Safe Transport of Radioactive Material requires "multilateral approval" for
shipments containing radioactive material.9' The term "multilateral approval"
means obtaining approval from "each country through" which the radioactive
material is to be transported. 2 Here, Appollonia failed to comply with these
regulations, as confirmed by the IAEA in its final report on Appollonia's
nuclear program: "Appollonia gives no notice to affected States such as Raglan
that MOX will be transported through their territorial waters or exclusive
economic zones."'93
Because the regulations require the approval of "each country through"
which the material is transported, obligations clearly run to third states not party
to the IAEA regime. Both Appollonia and Raglan are parties to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). While a treaty generally only
creates reciprocal rights between parties to the treaty, Article 36 of the VCLT
provides that rights in a treaty can arise for third parties if the parties to the
treaty so intend and the third party state assents thereto. 9' The assent of the
third party state "shall be presumed" so long as nothing contrary is indicated. 95
Because there is no indication of contrary intent, Raglan has the right to raise
Appollonia's violation of the IAEA regulations under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, even though it is not party to the NPT or a
member of the IAEA.
89. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 121 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161, art. IlH [hereinafter NPT].
90. Statute of the Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, art XIll, 1973, Int'l Atomic Energy Agency,
available at http: //www.iaea.org/About/statute-text.html.
91. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL § 820 (1996) [hereinafter IAEA Regulations].
92. Id. at § 204.
93. Compromis, 9.
94. Vienna Convention, supra note 53, art. 34.
95. Id. art. 36; I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1969).
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D. Appollonia Is Responsible For All Environmental Damage To The
Norton Shallows And Must Compensate Raglan For The Resulting Injury To
Its Fishing And Tourist Industries And The Cost Of Decontaminating The
Area
1. Raglan has standing under international law to seek redress on behalf of
the international community for a violation of the erga omnes obligation to
protect the marine environment
Raglan's claim for damage to the Shallows relies upon the erga omnes
doctrine. This Court has recognized that there are certain obligations owed to
the international community erga omnes and that all states have a legal interest
in upholding them.96 Customary international law recognizes the obligation on
the part of all states to "protect and preserve the marine environment." All
nations have accepted the obligation to ensure against activities that "cause
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."97
Appollonia may argue that the international community has never
recognized the ability to bring a claim actio popularis, on behalf of all people.
This argument is misguided. In the Southwest Africa case, this Court, while
refusing to recognize a claim actio popularis, intimated it was emerging.9"
Subsequently, in Barcelona Traction, this Court considered that, in view of the
importance of obligations owed to the international community as a whole, "all
states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection."99 Additionally,
distinguished publicists have repeatedly urged this Court to recognize actio
popularis in various contexts, particularly as a technique to ensure protection
of the environment.00
If the concept of actiopopularis were ever to be recognized by this Court,
surely this is the case. The damage to the Shallows was proximate to Raglan
and resulted in serious economic consequences. Additionally, Raglan is party
to numerous treaties establishing the duty to protect the marine environment.
While no singular injury may be sufficient to confer standing upon Raglan, the
totality of the circumstances in this case point towards this Court's recognition
of an actio popularis. Without this extension, no state may legally protect the
interests of the high seas. To require a territorial injury to states seeking to
96. Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 253, 310 (June 22); Barcelona Traction Light & Power
Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 LC.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
97. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 88.
98. Barcelona Traction, supra note 96, at 47; Sw Africa Case (Second Phase) (Eth. and Liber. v.
S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
99. Barcelona Traction, supra note 96, at 33; See also Nuclear Tests, 1974 LC.J. at 321.
100. IAN BROWNLIE, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1, 5 (1974).
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uphold the duty to protect the marine environment renders that norm a virtual
nullity. In such circumstances, the cost to each state of damaging common
spaces would be externalized,'' and the earth's common spaces would be
severely abused.
2. Appollonia breached the internationally recognized obligation to prevent
transboundary injury
The customary international law obligation to prevent transboundary
environmental harm is rooted in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,
which establishes state responsibility for transboundary environmental harm." 2
Although the drafters opted for a non-binding declaration of principles, various
treatises,103 textbooks, 1' 4 and scholars0 5 state that Principle 21 reflects custom-
ary international law. Indeed, it has been called the cornerstone of international
environmental law.'0 6
a. Appollonia incurs liability for damage to the Shallows under
the sic utere tuo principle
The principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laeda (one must use his own
so as not to damage that of another) imposes an obligation on states to prevent
transboundary environmental injury.'0 7 Raglan submits that sic utere tuo is
customary law in the area of transnational environmental injury, as evidenced
by its incorporation into a number of international treaties' and declarations,
109
101. L.F.E. Goldie, The Management of Ocean Resources: Regimes for Structuring the Maritime
Environment, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 172 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk
eds., 4th vol. 1972).
102. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 88, at princ. 21; John Knox, The Myth and Reality of
Transboundary Envtl. Impact Assessment, 96 Am. J. Intl L. 291, 296 (2002).
103. ALEXANDRE KiSS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 130 (1991);
DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS]
104. EDITH BROwN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY 317 (1998).
105. David Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Env't and Dev.: Two Steps Forward and One Back or
Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 620 (1995); Rudiger Wolftum, Purposes and Principles ofInternational
Environmental Law, 1990 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 308, 310.
106. DOCUMENTS, supra note 103, at 7; WEISS ET AL., supra note 104, at 316.
107. Armin Rosencranz, The Origin and Emergence of International Environmental Norms, 26
HASTINGS INT'L & CON]. L. REv. 309, 309 (2003); Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, Int ' Envtl. Regulation,
and the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENVT'L L. J. 173,204-09
(1992).
108. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 194(2); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,
prmbl., 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
109. Rio Declaration, supra note 88, print. 2; Stockholm Declaration, supra note 88.
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including the 1982 Convention, and international decisions holding states
responsible for extraterritorial environmental harm regardless of fault." 0
Several cases illustrate the sic utere tuo principle. In the 1941 Trail
Smelter Arbitration,"' the tribunal applied the principle in holding Canada
responsible for agricultural damage in the United States resulting from sulphur
dioxide fumes emitted from a private smelter in British Colombia. Likewise,
in Corfu Channel"2 this Court held that every state has an obligation "not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
States.....3 In the 1974 Nuclear Test Cases before this Court, Judge de Castro
confirmed the obligation to prevent transboundary harm as a principle of
international law. 1 4 More recently, the decision of this Court in its advisory
opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons"5 evidences
the existence of the obligation to prevent transboundary environmental harm
arising from hazardous activities. Other arbitral awards, including the Lac
Lanoux" 6 and Gut Dam"7 arbitrations, confirm the existence of this obligation.
While Appollonia has a right to pursue its own economic and environmental
policies, in accordance with international law," 8 it has an obligation to ensure
that activities within its control do not damage the environment beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction." 9
b. Appollonia incurs liability for damage to the Shallows under the
precautionary principle
Appollonia's failure to take adequate precautions to safeguard its MOX
shipments violates the precautionary principle. A number of present day
international legal instruments enshrine this doctrine, 20 evidencing its general
310. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1938), reprinted
in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941); Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Lexis at 40;
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 41.
111. See Trail Smelter, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1905.
112. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9).
113. Id.
114. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 389.
115. Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Lexis at 40.
116. Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 22 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281, 314-317 (Pern. Ct. Arb.
1957).
117. Gut Dam Arbitration, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 316, 316-18 (1969).
118, Rio Declaration, supra note 88, princ. 2.
119. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Int'l Law
Comm'n, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 UNGAOR A/56/10 (Nov. 2001).
120. See Rio Declaration, supra note 88, princ. 15; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, art. , Nov. 13, 1972, 26 U.N.T.S. 2406; See U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, opened for signature May 9, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849.
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acceptance as a norm of customary international law.12 1  Indeed, in the
environmental context, there are no instances of nations refusing to apply the
precautionary principle. 22 The European Union promulgated the precautionary
principle as a binding principle of their environmental policy.
23
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides that
it is necessary for states to "apply preventive, precautionary and anticipatory
approaches so as to avoid degradation of the marine environment, as well as to
reduce the risk of long-term or irreversible adverse effects upon it.' 2 4 The
principle recognizes that states using the oceans must err on the side of
protecting the environment.2  A state that fails to assess the extraterritorial
environmental impact of its proposed activities can hardly claim that it has taken
all practical measures to prevent environmental damage. 26 Accordingly, the
precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof in environmentally risky
activities to the state that engages in the activity.
127
Appollonia had a customary international law obligation to evaluate the
possible effects of transporting nuclear materials through the Raglanian
archipelago and to determine the deadly consequences that could result from an
accident. Appollonia's failure to reassess its plan of action after being delayed
by storms is but one example of Appollonia's failure to take the necessary
precautions. These failures incur Appollonia liable for the damages to the
Norton Shallows caused by The Mairi Maru.
3. Appollonia is strictly liable for the damage to the Norton Shallows
a. Strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities is a general principle of law
The principle of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities is a general
principle of international law and may be applied in this case. 2 ' The principle
121. Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Lexis at 40; Communication
from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000)1 (Feb. 2, 2000).
122. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments ofRadioactive
Materials, 27 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 379 (1996).
123. See DAVID HUNTER, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 405-11 (2d
ed. 2002).
124. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14 1992, Report of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, para. 17.22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol.
I) (Aug. 13, 1992).
125. Van Dyke, supra note 122, at 383.
126. 126. Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in Int I1Envil. Agreements, 67 BRrr Y.B. INT'L
L. 275, 279 (1996).
127. Daniel Bodansky, The Precautionary Principle in US. Environmental Law, in INTERPRETING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 203, 210 (Tim O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994).
128. UNCLOS, supra note 4, § I(A), part 1 & n.8 pp. 2-3; See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E.
BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 92-98 (1994); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the
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of strict liability has its roots in antediluvian law, 129 and is found in the modem
legal systems of most states.'30 Strict liability of states, even in conducting "not
unlawful" ultra-hazardous activities, has been accepted in conventions con-
ceming nuclear activities, outer space activities, and marine oil pollution. 3'
These conventions articulate the principle that a state may be liable even though
its activities were not wrongful. 3 2 The ILC approved this general concept of
liability without unlawfulness."'
State practice supports this proposition. Several multilateral treaties hold
states operating nuclear ships strictly liable for nuclear damage caused by an
accident involving nuclear fuel or wastes from the ship.'34 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, whose members include the United
States, United Kingdom, and Japan, adopted the "polluter pays" principle in
relation to routine accidental pollution.'35 The European Union moved toward
formal adoption of strict liability for environmental pollution in June 2003.36
A recent survey showed that the doctrine of strict liability applies in such
diverse legal systems as the Federal Republic of Germany, the U.S., Mexico,
Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLLUTION 61, 63-64 (Daniel Barstow Magra ed., 1991).
129. See, e.g., LUDOVIC BEAUCHET, 4 HISTOI.E DU DROIT PRIVt DE LA RtPUBLIQUE ATHENIENNE
(1976); THE CODE OF MAiNMONIDES: BOOK OF TORTS (BOOK XI) (Hyman Klein trans., 1954); The
HAMMURABI CODE, arts. 195-246 (Chilperic Edwards trans., Kennikat Press 2003) (1904).
130. Vernon Palmer, A General Theory ofThe Inner Structure ofStrict Liability: Common Law, Civil
Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1303, 1309 (1988); see also Sobranie PostanovIenii Sovieta
Ministrov [Rsfsr] [Collection of Rsfst Gov't Regulations] 1964, § 454 (U.S.S.R.); Code. civ. art. 1384 (Fr.);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977). See also, Ryland v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 H.L. 330, 337, 341 (1868);
Francis Bohlen, The Rule in Ryland v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 310 (1911).
131. See, e.g. Vienna Convention on Civil Liab. for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 2 LL.M.
727,733; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. II, Mar. 21, 1972,
24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
132. Constance O'Keefe, Transboundary Pollution and the Strict Liability Issue: The Work of the
In 'l Law Comm "n on the Topic of Int 7 Liab. for Injurious Consequences Arising Out ofActs Not Prohibited
by Int l Law, 18 DENv. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 145, 147 (1990).
133. Fourth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited By International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 (1983); Alan Boyle, Codification ofInternational
Environmental Law and the International Law Commission: Injurious Consequences Revisited, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
61, 76-79 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999).
134. See Paris Convention on Third Party Liab. in the Field of Nuclear Energy and its Additional
Protocol, Jan. 28, 1964, 956 U.N.T.S. 264; Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 31, 1963, 2 LL.M. 685.
135. The Organization for Economic Cooperation, The Implementation of the Polluter-Pays
Principle, art. III(1), Doc. No. C(74)223 (Nov. 14, 1974), available' at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/oced/OCED-4.09.htn.
136. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Cmty., art. 130R, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11;
Council Recommendation (EEC) of Mar. 3, 1075, O.J. (L 194) 1.
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Venezuela, Egypt, Libya, Senegal, Madagascar, Ethiopia, India, Thailand,
Syria, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Japan and is part of the civil codes
of Russia and France.137 Even publicists generally resistant to the notion of
strict liability acknowledge the responsibility of flag states for ultra-hazardous
vessel conduct.' Appollonia is strictly liable for any damage caused by the
transportation of ultra-hazardous waste through the Raglanian archipelago.
b. Appollonia is strictly liable for any damage caused by the transportation
of ultra-hazardous waste through the Raglanian Archipelago
For strict liability to attach to a state in connection with private activity,
international law requires 1) an ultra-hazardous activity 2) of transnational
character 3) under the control of the state. 139 These conditions are clearly met
in this case. First, transportation of radioactive material, such as MOX, is an
ultra-hazardous activity."4  Second, the injury is of transnational character
because Appollonia's actions caused damage beyond the area of its national
jurisdiction. Finally, Appollonian officials commissioned The Mairi Maru to
transport the ultra-hazardous material.
Appollonia may argue that the decision by the crew of The Mairi Maru to
transit through the Raglanian archipelago was that of a private vessel and is thus
not attributable to Appollonia. However, conduct of private individuals may be
directly imputable to a state where the individuals acted on behalf of the state,
having been charged to carry out a specific operation.141 When a state assumes
legal authority over a ship by grant of its flag, the state also assumes an
obligation to take measures to ensure that the vessel acts in a fashion consistent
with international law.'42 Here, the Appollonian government charged The Mairi
Maru's captain and crew with the transportation of MOX. As a result,
Appollonia was responsible for insuring that the vessel complied with its
137. See, e.g., JOHAN LAMMERS, TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 101-03
(1985); J.M. Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 13 HARV. INT'LJ. 209,216
(1972).
138. WILFRED JENKS, LIABILITY FORULTRA-HAZARDOUS ACTIVmESN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967);
N. A. Ushakov, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its 26th Session, reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 157 (pt. 1);
Gunther Handl, State Liab. for Accidental Transnat ' Envtl. Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
525, 565 (1980).
139. Kelson, supra note 137, at 209; See generally, Jenks, supra note 138, at 151.
140. Jenks, supra note 138, at 193.
141. Roberto Ago, Third Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/246 and ADD.1-3,
reprinted in [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199 (pt. 1); Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24).
142. BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1962); ROBERT RIENOW, THE TEST OF
NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL (1937).
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obligations under international law and is obliged to make reparations for the
injuries suffered by Raglan.
4. Assuming a fault-based standard applies to the incident involving The
Mairi Maru, the damage caused to the Norton Shallows was foreseeable and
imputable to Appollonia
Appollonia may argue for a due diligence approach to liability.143 Under
this approach, each state has a duty to exercise "due diligence" to ensure
suitable protection of the rights of other states.'44 The standard of due diligence
required depends upon the particular situation; protection of the environment
requires an especially high degree of diligence. 145 It is a general principle of law
that the exact nature of the ensuing damage need not be foreseeable; it is
sufficient if that type of harm ought to have been foreseen.146 Each state has a
duty to take steps to prevent any vessel flying its flag from engaging in conduct
harmful to the environment of another state. 147
Appollonia must have been aware that its MOX shipments presented a
serious risk of danger: the substances that leaked into the waters off the Norton
Shallows were highly noxious, and the ship's path led straight through the
shallow waters of Raglan's archipelago. Given Appollonia's inability to
adequately protect these shipments, and the transnational risks associated with
transporting it, due diligence required some control over the way in which The
Mairi Maru went about its transport.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent, the Kingdom of Raglan,
respectfully requests this Honorable Court to find, adjudge, and declare as
follows:
1. That Raglan is not responsible for the attack on The Mairi Maru, and
owes no Appollonia no compensation for any injury arising from the
attack.
143. Alan Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences ofActs
Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 14-15 (1990);
David D. Caron, The Law ofthe Env't: A Symbolic Step of Modest Value, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 528,536 (1999).
144. Riccardo-Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm,
in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 15, 21 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio
Scovazzi eds., 1991); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL ASPECrS
OF TRANS-FRONTIER POLLUTION 384 (1977).
145. Id. at 371.
146. Hughes v. Lord Advocate (1963) A.C. 837, 847 (H.L.).
147. Jenks, supra note 138, at 141.
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2. That Raglan breached no obligation owed to Appollonia under
international law by scuttling The Mairi Maru.
3. That Appollonia violated international law by shipping MOX through
Raglan's archipelagic waters without giving Raglan prior notice or
receiving its consent.
4. That Appollonia is responsible for the damage to the Norton Shallows
and must compensate Raglan for the injury to its fishing and tourist
industries and the cost of decontaminating the area.
